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1  A turning point in the balance of thinking and influence 
In this study, I shall first examine why and how the balance of development thinking 
and practice changed around 1980. This turning point coincided with a change of 
influence at the level of strategic thinking from the UN to the Bretton Woods 
Institutions. Second, I shall look into the possibility of future turning points in 
development thinking and practice. In doing so, I shall describe, first, what could well 
become (and is already becoming) a new and expanded general concept of development, 
and second, the very opposite, namely development not as a global but as a regional and 
local strategy. Thus having examined the future at the global, regional and national 
levels of development thinking, the study ends with reflections about the interests that 
lie behind the ideas that help to explain why they get implemented or not, why there are 
turning points or not. 
 
During the 1940s and 1950s the UN was the place where big ideas about economic and 
social development policies were initiated. This continued during the 1960s and 1970s 
with the initiation of the UN Development Decades, the unified approach of UNRISD, 
and the elaboration of employment and basic needs oriented development strategies by 
the ILO. It was in this connection that Hans Singer discovered the concept of 
‘redistribution from growth’ during the Kenya High-Level Comprehensive Employment 
Mission (ILO 1972). During the 1970s the World Bank entered the scene of alternative 
thinking about development thanks to Hollis Chenery who elaborated and systematized 
the Singer analysis setting it into a broader statistical framework using data banks and 
analytical resources from the World Bank. He changed the title in the process from 
redistribution from growth to redistribution with growth (Chenery et al. 1974).  
 
All this changed at the end of the 1970s with a harsh reversal of economic policies 
followed hitherto and a move toward neoliberal and neoclassical policies that 
emphasized privatization and liberalization. This policy reversal was soon followed in 
all OECD countries and became the conventional wisdom of the West. Contrary to what 
the innocent bystander might have thought at the time, this ‘new’ orthodoxy did not 
come out of the blue. Turning points rarely come out the blue. It had been prepared 
carefully over time by a core of neoclassical economists. Indeed, the 1970s saw the 
emergence of two opposing trends in development thinking. One trend consisted in 
widening the scope of the development strategies pursued by explicitly including social 
considerations, such as education, health, nutrition, employment, income distribution, 
basic needs, poverty reduction, environmental considerations, gender, and so on. The 
other trend was represented by a return to neoclassical thinking. And so, as development 
thinking during the 1970s became more comprehensive and more poverty and income 
distribution oriented, the groundwork was laid by the followers of the neoclassical and 
neoliberal approach that was to become the ‘new’ paradigm of the 1980s and beyond. 
For example, the criticism of import substitution became more precise, technical and   2
empirical (Little et al. 1970). This early work was followed by other studies that 
represented an important strengthening of the theoretical framework of the open-
economy model. The same reasoning applies to the monetarist strand of the neoclassical 
resurgence. 
 
This new paradigm was of course a recycled version of trickle-down economics, with 
growth given greater weight than income distribution and social objectives. The 
underlying hypothesis was that policy reforms designed to achieve efficiency and 
growth would also promote better living standards, especially for the poorest. The social 
costs of structural adjustment were inconvenient but temporary; in any case they were 
inevitable in order for countries to return to more rational and viable economic 
structures. Not only did this ‘new’ orthodoxy become the economic strategy of the West 
but, through its adoption by the World Bank and the IMF it became the conventional 
wisdom of practically the entire globe, whether voluntarily or not. The (important) 
exception here were the East Asian countries that went under a variety of labels, such as 
the Asian tigers, the Flying Geese, etc. 
 
The Bretton Woods Institutions adopted the reversal of policies because the Western 
countries could impose their will in the Board, given the weighted voting system. Once 
adopted, they (that is, the Bretton Woods institutions and Western countries) could 
impose it on the rest of the world—also in the light of the international debt crisis. It 
was a typical case of the power of the purse versus the power of ideas. The purse won 
mainly, we contend, because of the absence of ideas on the part of the UN and the rest 
of the world during this period, with the exception, once again, of East Asia.  
 
But, it can be asked, where had all the Nobel laureates gone who had been so 
instrumental in the early years to shape development thinking both in the UN and in the 
world at large? In 1980 most of them were still very much alive. Jan Tinbergen, Gunnar 
Myrdal, W. Arthur Lewis, Richard Stone, James Meade, Amartya Sen and others were 
still very active. But no consistent counteroffensive was mounted in the early 1980s. 
True enough, hundreds of British economists1 signed their rejection of Thatcherite 
economics, but with little effect on practical policy or ideological stance. And so the 
purse won mainly because the existing ideas of the 1970s were not defended and 
adapted strongly and carefully enough and no alternative ideas were brought forward in 
a sufficiently authoritative fashion. We had to wait until the 1990s for this to happen—
in terms of thinking rather than of practice—when the series of Human Development 
Reports were launched by Mabub ul Haq and his small team at the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP).2  
                                                 
1   Three hundred and sixty-four, to be precise. 
2   UNDP (various) Human Development Report.   3
2  The future of development as a global concept 
What is amazing when it comes to development thinking is the dominance of Western 
ideas. Starting with modernization theory, all the development approaches are ‘Western’ 
and are dominated by economists. This remains true even with strategies conceived by 
thinkers from the South or the East.  
 
The classicists and the other great names in development thinking were all from Europe 
and secondarily from the United States. Development thinking in the modern era, since 
1945, saw a wider cast of characters come to the fore, but it remained a global concept 
that was not ‘deconstructed’, to use Escobar’s (1995) terminology. The labour-surplus 
model, the big push, balanced and unbalanced growth, great spurt, and stages of 
economic growth doctrines were all of European and American extraction. The only 
person from a developing country—W. Arthur Lewis—did not depart from his 
neoclassical upbringing.  
 
The same applies to the Marxist school of thought, although to a lesser degree. For 
instance, Paul Baran saw European colonialism interfering not only with development 
in the precapitalist colonies but modifying their future development path as well. His 
analysis points to the asymmetrical power and political relations—rather than god-given 
‘natural endowments’ and free-market-determined ‘comparative advantages’—in 
determining the growth path followed by many underdeveloped countries. Baran (1957) 
concluded that ‘far from serving as an engine of economic expansion, of technological 
progress, and of social change, the capitalist order in these countries has represented a 
framework for economic stagnation, for archaic technology and for social 
backwardness’. Baran and Sweezy (1966) inverted the law of uneven development on a 
worldscale relative to the formulations of the classical Marxist analysis of imperialism: 
rather than slowing down the accumulation in the advanced countries, imperialism 
blocked development in the less developed economies. The internal dynamics of 
underdeveloped societies came to be seen as fundamentally determined by their 
insertion into the world capitalist system. Although their analysis was pertinent and 
interesting, their suggestions for setting up an alternative development approach 
remained highly tentative and defensive and not really departing from its Western 
origins. 
 
What is ‘Western’ about all this is that no account is taken of local thinking in and local 
theorists of developing countries. A possible exception is Raul Prebisch and the Latin 
American Structuralist School that emerged in the late 1940s. Here development and 
underdevelopment are seen as related processes occurring within a single, dynamic 
economic system. Development is generated in some areas—the Center defined as those 
countries whose economies were first penetrated by capitalist production techniques—
and underdevelopment is generated in others—the periphery. Modern 
underdevelopment is therefore seen as a result of a process of structural change in the 
peripheral economies that occurs in conjunction with—is conditioned by, but not caused   4
unilaterally by—their relations with the Center (Prebisch 1950). So even here the 
Western influence is important, as it is in the writings of Cardoso and Faletto (1979), 
Samir Amin, and others of the dependencia school. 
 
The neoclassical resurgence we have observed since 1980 is of course totally Western 
bred, but so were the redistribution with growth and the basic needs development 
strategies of the 1970s. Although the latter did explicitly take into consideration the 
specific circumstances of the developing countries, they remained embedded in Western 
concepts and thinking. 
 
The events of the past decades challenge much of the validity of these Western 
development theories, whether liberal or Marxist, neoclassical or post-Keynesian. They 
did not anticipate turning points, collapses or failures; neither did they explain them ex 
post. They do not explain why so many countries do not seem to be able to take off 
economically or are regressing to previous levels of economic development. They do 
not explain either the ‘ennui’ in the apparently successful countries. Examples are the 
totally unanticipated collapse of communism and the reintegration of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into the capitalist world economy. Nor do 
they give an explanation of the reappearance of virulent nationalism and ethnic conflicts 
as well as the rapid growth of militant religious fundamentalism in both Western and 
non-Western societies. The economic stagnation and decline in African and Latin 
American countries; the imposition and the lack of success of structural adjustment 
programs, especially in Africa, the rapid state-led industrialization of the East Asian 
countries cannot be explained by any rational criteria of the Washington Consensus 
school. Hence, all of those were on the whole not anticipated by either mainstream or 
more radical theories of development. In the face of such a failure to foresee major 
changes it can be maintained that we are witnessing a crisis in development theory even 
if in practice many stress the average progress achieved.  
 
None of the theories—whether of the modernization, dependency, neoliberal or Marxist 
variety—seem to be working in the sense that they have all run into trouble, even if 
initial successes were secured. During the 1980s and 1990s these theories have been 
supplanted by a hegemonic neoliberal view of development based on ‘globalization’, 
‘free markets’ that effectively dismiss questions of ethnicity, of culture, and does not try 
to understand nationalism, fundamentalism and terrorism. It can be maintained that the 
whole Western model of development, the ‘paradigm of modernity’, of a secular, 
industrial nation-state, is now in question and that a coherent and persuasive alternative 
model is yet to be found. 
 
It would appear obvious that within the global economy enough flexibility must be 
created to make room for regional and national variations toward development polices, 
given the specific situation of the region or country in question. For instance, it can 
hardly be maintained that the Washington Consensus has been a success story in Latin   5
America. In 1996, Ajit Singh challenged his Latin American colleagues to say how 
much more time they needed before being able to say that the Washington Consensus 
has been a failure. ‘Five more years’, they answered.3 Five years later the picture was as 
follows: Argentina was in turmoil, President Menem under house arrest, his successor 
and two more Presidents gone by the wayside; Fujimori was in Japan and his country 
Peru in trouble; the Mexicans have not waited five years to oust the PRI in power for 
practically the entire twentieth century, although it is not all clear whether Vicente Fox 
has been able to find his own way; the Venezuelans sacked the traditional parties who 
squandered the oil revenues and replaced them by a populist Hugo Chavez; and we 
could go down the tragic list, from Colombia to Brazil via Ecuador. What lessons can 
and must be learned from all this? 
3  Toward a new and flexible concept of development: forks in the road 
There are two questions that one must ask when it comes to development theory and 
practice. The first is whether the approach adopted up until now is comprehensive 
enough or still too narrowly economistic; the second relates to the problem of 
homogeneity, i.e. in how far must development policies be adapted and changed 
according to the culture of a given region or country. In other words, the question before 
us is whether there is one theory and one practice for the entire world, with a little 
tinkering at the margins to take account of regional differences, or whether there should 
be many theories and many practices in order to tailor make development policies 
according to the culture and habits of countries and regions. So far the former approach 
has been adopted with mixed results. This approach is now being finessed and 
broadened and we shall start this section presenting the state of play. The latter 
approach must be given more thought, as we will show. We are facing a fork in the 
development road. 
3.1  Broadening development theory and practice 
Amartya Kumar Sen, the 1998 Nobel prize laureate, has given this problem a lot of 
thought and has come to the conclusion that a universal approach is desirable, as long as 
development thinking covers a wider surface by bringing on board political, cultural, 
social and human right issues. One illustration of this belief is the importance he 
attaches to tolerance and pluralism, of democratic procedures in short: ‘To see political 
tolerance merely as a ‘Western liberal’ inclination seemed to me a serious mistake’.4 
Sen has always adopted a broad approach to development, including work on economic 
inequality, poverty, employment, technology, investigating the principles and 
implications of liberty and rights, assessing gender inequality, etc. In other words, his 
                                                 
3   Singh (1997: 48-61).  
4   ‘Autobiography of Amartya Kumar Sen’, www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1998/sen-autobio.html, 
p. 4.   6
interest gradually shifted from the pure theory of social choice to more ‘practical’ 
problems (Sen 1982, 1984).  
 
Subsequently, Sen (1985) started to explore an approach that sees individual advantage 
not merely as opulence or utility, but primarily in terms of the lives people manage to 
live and the freedom they have to choose the kind of life they have reason to value. The 
basic idea here is to pay attention to the actual ‘capabilities’ that people end up having. 
He elaborated his work on poverty by coming up with a universal definition, not of 
course in terms of purchasing power but of capabilities and functionings. The poor are 
poor because their set of capabilities is small, not because of what they do not have, but 
because of what they cannot do. This measure is universal because it entails identifying 
a set of capabilities, something like basic needs. A minimum list would include being 
able to lead a healthy and productive life, to communicate and participate in your 
community, to move about freely, and to have a family with a partner of your choice.  
 
Thus, Sen has elaborated a distinct agenda. Utility and income have been displaced 
from their primary positions in orthodox economics. Wellbeing is captured by things 
people can do rather than things people have. If their set of capabilities grows larger, 
people can do more of the things they would like to do. And so we arrive at a new and 
dynamic definition of freedom; choice over a larger set of capabilities (Desai 2000). 
Sen’s (1999) emphasis on freedom of choice led him naturally to attach prime 
importance to democracy as a preferred political system: ‘A country does not have to be 
deemed fit for democracy; rather, it has to become fit through democracy. 
 
But what exactly is democracy? Sen asserts that we must not identify democracy with 
majority rule. Democracy does, of course, include voting and respect for election 
results, but it also requires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal 
entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of 
news and fair comment. ‘Even the idea of ‘needs’, including the understanding of 
‘economic needs’, requires public discussion and exchange of information, views, and 
analysis (Sen 1999: 10).  
 
Thus, Amartya Sen does not quite trust unadulterated market economics, is in favour of 
democratic decision making, and calls for social support in development. He has been 
arguing in favour of softer, gentler and more humane economics and economic policies. 
When he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1998, he was credited by the Royal Swedish 
Academy with ‘having restored an ethical dimension to economics’. He points out that 
in the classical writings on development it was always assumed that economic 
development was a benign process, in the interest of the people. The view that one must 
ignore any kind of social sympathies for the underdog, and that you cannot have 
democracy, did not become the dominant thought until the beginning of modern   7
development economics, say as of the 1950s.5 Sen elabourates on the notion of 
development viewed as a ‘fierce’ as opposed to seeing it as a ‘friendly’ process. The 
former asks for a ‘needed sacrifice’ in order to achieve a better future. This approach, 
with its emphasis on capital accumulation, is not wrong, but suffers from several 
handicaps mostly relating to the comparative neglect of the wellbeing and quality of life 
in the present and near future. Sen (1997: 537) concludes: 
 
Those who see in this a model to follow have continued to argue for 
giving priority to business … interests so that the productive power of 
the nation can be radically expanded, and they warn against the spoiling 
of long-run benefits by the premature operation of sympathy; they are 
terrified of the harm that may result from the influence of ‘bleeding 
hearts’. The ‘friendly’ approach, by contrast, sees development as a 
process where people help each other and themselves with an emphasis 
on human skills and human capital, and on the role of human qualities in 
promoting and sustaining economic growth. Ultimately, the focus is on 
the expansion of human freedom to live the kind of lives people have 
reason to value. And, thus, the role of economic growth in expanding 
these opportunities has to be integrated into that more foundational 
understanding of the process of development. 
 
And so we have been moving toward a global, a universal concept of development in 
which physical and human capital accumulation remain important ingredients, but 
where social objectives, freedom, democracy, ethnicity, human rights are becoming at 
least as crucial. It took time to realize that education is not just a consumption good that 
can be afforded as of a certain level of development, but that it is also an investment in 
human capital that is a prerequisite to attain that level of development. In the same way, 
we must now get used to the idea that social and ethnic inequalities, absence of freedom 
and democracy are as much reasons for lack of development than absence of 
investments. The concept of development not only becomes much more comprehensive 
and all embracing, but the causative links and relationships are being reversed. This line 
of thought also underlies the concept of human development, initiated by ul Haq (with 
the active assistance of Sen) in the Human Development Reports mentioned earlier. 
 
Obviously, it can be argued that the ‘Sen approach’ to development must be more 
formally formulated in terms of an economic and social development model. Physical 
and human capital investments, sector allocation, human rights, freedom, etc must be 
integrated in a consistent whole in order to move away from words and toward a formal 
model.  
 
                                                 
5   ‘Humane Development – An Interview with Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize-winning Economist and 
Author of Development as Freedom’, www/theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/ba991215.htm, pp. 2-3.   8
3.2  Breaking down development nationally, locally and culturally 
There is a growing awareness of the importance of culture in the development process 
and of the cultural assumptions inherent in development theory and practice. The 
preceding section is based on the assumption that by broadening the concept of 
development the range of development models becomes progressively narrower. But the 
question that is being asked today is whether development models are determined 
culturally by each region, or by the culture of one region, namely the West.6 Culture 
will be defined here in a broad sense, as a way of life and living together. This relates to 
values people hold, to tolerance with respect to others (race, gender, foreigners), to 
outward versus inward orientations and inclinations, etc. 
 
More cultural freedom leaves us free to meet one of the most basic needs, ‘the need to 
define our own basic needs’ (UNESCO 1995: 15). But defining one’s own basic needs 
is one thing, the way to attain them, through which social and economic policies, for 
instance, is another. We must be careful to maintain a balance between universalism and 
localism and avoid moving from one extreme to another. The thesis of those who are in 
favour of more variety in development policies linked to local cultures, institutions and 
habits, goes somewhere along the following lines: 
(i)  Western culture has held an iron grip on development thinking and practice;  
(ii)  this influence has tended to increase further during the past twenty years; but 
(iii)  there do exist alternative development models based on a different cultural and 
institutional historical background; and  
(iv)  these alternatives are likely to multiply in the era of globalization that may, 
therefore, paradoxically witness more diversity rather than uniformity.  
 
Examples of such variations in development policies can be given. The Japanese and 
other East Asian authorities have always maintained that globalization does not imply 
that a universal model or uniform set of rules—as for instance implied in the 
Washington Consensus, but also in Sen’s much broader concept—spread to all parts of 
the world. According to one Japanese authority (a hard nosed top official of the 
Ministry of Finance who went under the nickname Mr Yen) ‘we have to recognize that 
what can be called localization, or an identification with local cultural values, is 
proceeding along with globalization’ (Sakakibara 1997). As was implied earlier most 
neoclassical economists tend to apply their ‘universal’ model unilaterally to all 
countries, neglecting the historical, institutional and cultural backgrounds of the 
countries in question. But there are doubters who recognize the plurality of economic 
systems or cultures and emphasize the interaction among them. For them the key 
concept is not universality, but diversity and interaction. 
 
                                                 
6   See for instance Escobar (1995).   9
For instance, it has been argued by many economists that deregulation must be 
implemented as intensively as possible, simultaneously and quickly on many fronts. But 
such an approach implicitly assumes that Anglo-American institutions are already in 
place or can be quickly established by enlightened reformers with the help of 
consultants and international organizations. This neglect of the validity of different 
cultures and evolutionary processes of history has often led to confusion and the 
collapse of the existing order rather than to reform. How can proper macroeconomic 
policies be conducted if the necessary infrastructure such as a central banking system 
and an effectively governed enterprise system do not exist? Forcing a uniform model on 
diverse country and cultural situations may endanger the economic future of these 
countries, as well as that of the world at large. 
 
The need for a differentiated approach has long been obvious, in view of the remarkable 
success of the East Asian development experience. This need is also felt because of the 
disquieting fact that in most countries that have adopted the current economic orthodoxy 
(read Washington Consensus) during the past 20 years or so, the distribution of income 
has worsened, poverty has tended to increase, and employment trends have been very 
uneven. The causal linkages have not yet been well understood, but the association 
between the adoption of a specific uniform model and the accentuation of problems of 
inequality and poverty is a cause for serious concern. If one of the priorities is ‘to bring 
the millions of dispossessed and disadvantaged in from the margins of society and 
cultural policy in from the margins of governance’ (Council of Europe 1996: 9), then 
bringing these two together by adapting the development models according to the needs, 
institutions, history and culture of different societies is an absolute must. The margins of 
manoeuvre may not be huge, but wider than one might suspect at first sight. That much 
has become clear from the East Asian development experience. These margins refer to 
institutions, consumption habits, land rights, property rights in general, access to 
markets, distribution systems, economic democracy, etc. The growing 
internationalization and globalization may provoke diversity at least as much as 
imposing uniformity. 
 
Participation and empowerment are, obviously, closely related to both cultural and 
economic rights and equality. Participation, a human right, is one of the key objects of 
cultural and economic policy, because it opens up both the economy and culture to as 
many people as possible. It is often forgotten that East Asian countries could only grow 
at such stupendous rates of 8 to 9 per cent a year over such a long time, because there 
was full employment, that is, everybody participated actively in the economy. In other 
words, there was growth from below. One cannot expect countries to grow much 
beyond 3 to 4 per cent until the bottom half of the population is participating and 
contributing. ‘The issue is not so much that of growth with distribution; growth with 
distribution can be achieved by a few cooks preparing a pie and distributing the pieces 
to a larger group through transfers. It is instead a matter of the poor becoming cooks   10
too, and of more cooks preparing a bigger pie’ (Birdsall: 1997: 394-99). For the ‘poor’ 
one can and must read immigrants, women, unemployed, certain ethnic groups, etc. 
 
East Asia can be seen as a mild case of economic differentiation from the mainstream. It 
was less based on theory than on actual practice. There is, however, a school of thought 
that wants to go further. This school is best illustrated by the ‘decontructionist’ 
approach of Escobar (1995). What this school is pleading for is differentiated 
development policies based on the cultural, institutional and historical characteristics of 
a given region as determined by the participation and empowerment of the people. It is a 
bottom-up approach pushed to its extreme. However, if an extreme approach is 
discarded, what remains is an important policy alternative, namely the desirability to 
include local variations on the national, regional and global development theme. The 
‘realistic’ approach here takes as a starting point the alleged fact that development 
policies are to a very large extent top-down, ethnocentric and technocratic that treat 
people and cultures as abstract concepts. They are composed of a series of technical 
interventions that are supposed to be universally applicable. The alternative is to be 
much more sensitive to local and social and cultural practice that is producing local 
models of economic activity. In other words, ‘the remaking of development must thus 
start by examining local constructions, to the extent that they are the life and history of a 
people, that is, the conditions of and for change’ (Escobar 1995).  
 
According to this school of thought, development theory and practice has not paid 
sufficient attention, if at all, to the cultural dynamics of incorporating local thinking and 
practice into the global orthodoxy of economic thought. Nor has it attempted to make 
visible the local constructions that exist side by side with the might of global forces. 
There is, therefore, no question of proposing grand alternatives here; alternatives that 
can be applied to all places and all situations. In a sense, the proponents of this version 
of deconstruction go further than that by introducing many local variations on the 
general theme (any general theme) that in turn will effect the global orthodoxy.  
 
We have reviewed here examples of development approaches that attempt to broaden 
the scope in order to make them more comprehensive on the one hand, and of allowing 
local traditions and practice to play an important role on the other. Both approaches 
have the same rationale, namely to make the development policies more realistic and 
hence to produce better results for all individuals on this earth. However, both would 
imply a turning point in development policies at some time in the future. And once 
again, just like the turning point around 1980, it will not have come out of the blue.  
4  The interests behind the ideas 
‘An idea whose time has come’, as the saying goes. Why does the time for certain ideas 
come, when it comes? What are the political and other interests involved? Can really 
important ideas that change institutions and structures only be adopted after a disaster?   11
Why are certain periods in history pervaded by optimism and action and others by 
pessimism and passivity? What explains these cycles of optimism and pessimism, of 
action and passivity, of moving from one extreme to another?  
 
On a personal note, I have been very much influenced in my answer to such questions 
by an event that happened when I was a young man in The Netherlands. On 1 February 
1953 the dikes broke and a flood resulted in which more than 2,000 people drowned. 
During the debate that followed it became clear that warning signals had been given 
frequently in the past to the effect that such a disaster could happen if and when an 
exceptional combination of events occurred (full moon, northwestern gales of a certain 
force, etc.). The probability for such a constellation of factors to happen was, however, 
small. And so successive Dutch governments said ‘Apres nous le deluge’, and nothing 
was done. It was only after the deluge actually happened that a long-term plan was 
elaborated (the so-called Delta Plan) to cut off all big rivers from the sea at very 
considerable expense. The impressive result of dikes, bridges and other works of art can 
be admired by anybody driving from Antwerp to Rotterdam today.  
 
The long-term plan and the considerable expense were only decided upon after the 
disaster. In the same way it took the disasters of the Great Depression and the Second 
World War to adopt new economic policies and a new international financial and 
political architecture by introducing and embracing Keynesian economics, the Bretton 
Woods institutions, the UN, and the Marshall Plan. So one thing is quite clear. 
Important ideas and exceptional people get more of a chance in exceptional 
circumstances and when disasters are on us. This is sad but true. Cassandras are never 
listened to, as the Dutch experts learned at their and the population’s expense, and as we 
can also deduce from the environmental and Kyoto saga.7 
 
Can one find exceptions to this ‘rule’ where disasters are headed of before they strike? 
To a certain extent, yes. One could point to the advances in road and car safety, 
although the number of annual deaths on the roads continues to amount to an infinitely 
bigger disaster each year than the number of deaths during the 1953 flood in The 
Netherlands. The immunization programme as launched by UNICEF during the 1980s 
would come close to a real exception to the rule, although once again the number of 
children that died each year before the programme was dreadful. The green revolution 
and the new seeds are probably the clearest exception to the rule, but even here hunger 
and its victims has already struck many times. An intelligent policy approach to global 
warming would be the real exception, but we are not yet there.8 
 
What makes the difference when it comes to the multitude of ideas at the second and 
third level of importance where millions of lives may be at stake but that do not 
                                                 
7   See also Jenkins (2001).  
8   See, for example, Lomborg (2001: chapter 24).   12
revolutionize the existing political and institutional structure? What makes that the time 
has come for them or not? There are several reasons that can be mentioned here. First, 
there is the question of leadership. Strong, enlightened and visionary leadership can 
make all the difference in order to bring an idea to the attention of national policy 
makers worldwide. Courage and standing for one’s convictions go with this kind of 
leadership. 
 
A second reason is chance. It is like scientific research where one is looking for x and 
stumbles on y. John Maynard Keynes started out as a neoclassical economist and while 
writing the General Theory became ‘Keynes’. Raul Prebisch was a conventional central 
banker and while examining the data that Hans Singer had sent to him plus those he had 
collected himself became an unconventional economist and an advocate in favour of 
import substitution and center-periphery analysis. It is the combination of leadership 
and chance that can be very powerful. A case in point is Jim Grant meeting Jon Eliot 
Rohde who convinced him that more than half of all the deaths and disease among the 
children of the developing world was unnecessary, ‘because it was now relatively easy 
and cheaply preventable’ (Jolly 2001: 21). Other examples, like the eradication of 
smallpox, could be found. 
 
A third reason is participatory decision making. As already Max Weber remarked 
‘interaction creates ideas, imposing kills them’.9 In the social sciences, ideas rarely 
come to the isolated individual shivering in the cold of his or her room in the attic. They 
rather come through the interaction of many individuals and groups in the warm rice 
fields of Asia, for instance. The Green Revolution is an illustration of this thesis in that 
it came about through a mix of high-powered research and putting one’s ear to the 
ground. Listening to grass root movements, to neighborhood groups, etc., may well 
result in getting or sharpening ideas. It requires humility on the part of the professional 
to listen to those local workers, from another culture and with another mindset. It is at 
this point that we join what was said in Section 3 about identity and global development 
ideas or, as we called it, local variations on a global theme. 
 
But let us not make a secret about it, in the end money and power count a great deal 
when it comes to which ideas come to the fore and which are implemented. Money, 
therefore, is the fourth reason. A telling illustration here is the story of the policies that 
were to guide the transition countries in Central and East Europe and the former Soviet 
Union to transform them into capitalist societies. The battle of ideas was between the 
‘big bang’ approach and a more gradual, friendlier way of realizing this difficult 
transition. The idea that finally won was not necessarily the best, but rather the one with 
money and political clout to back it up. In the end it is obvious that an idea without the 
                                                 
9   Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, in which he also stated that interests (material and ideal), not ideas, 
dominate directly the actions of men.   13
backing of money and other forms of influence will never see the light of day. Or rather 
it may see the light of day but it will remain sidelined. 
 
The interests behind the ideas are a combination of the ambition of leaders, of influence, 
of local grass root movements, and of money with chance thrown in for good measure. 
Once again, inspired leadership is of the essence and so is humility to learn from the 
people on the ground. There are many ideas around that can result in better development 
policies and hence improve the living conditions of millions of people. Identifying them 
takes an open mind, a lot of curiosity and the will and leadership to bring them to the 
attention of the world. Baudrel (1985: 542) in one of his masterpieces, said it best: 
Sometimes an invention appears in isolation, brilliant but useless, the 
sterile fruit of some fertile brain; no more is heard of it. Sometimes there 
is takeoff of a kind … there is a burst of progress, the motor seems on the 
point of starting, and then the whole thing comes to a halt … A burst of 
progress followed by a collapse. Imperfect repetitions of each other 
though they may be, they are repetitions all the same and obvious 
comparisons practically suggest themselves.  
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